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CAUSES OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE
INTRODUCTION
The thrift industry' was designed to help people in local communities
afford their own homes.2 To accomplish this goal, thrifts accepted sav-
ings from individuals and in turn made low-rate mortgage loans to local
citizens.3
Thrift asset portfolios have been traditionally restricted in their com-
position to long-term, fixed-rate mortgages that were financed by short-
term deposits.' After the Great Depression, the industry prospered
under this regulatory framework, functioning best when interest rates
were stable.' Thrifts profited from the spread between the rate they paid
to depositors and the rate they charged on mortgage loans.6 Since the
late 1960s, however, the thrift industry has steadily deteriorated. The
inability of thrifts to diversify their portfolios left them vulnerable to the
"maturity gap" risk inherent in funding long-term mortgage loans with
short-term customer deposits. For many years, Congress, the executive
branch7 and the industry itselfS minimized or ignored the industry's de-
1. The term "thrift" includes savings-and-loan associations, credit unions and sav-
ings banks. See M. Stich, How to Profit from the Savings and Loan Crisis 230 (1989).
All three accept funds primarily from individual depositors and then lend them to the
public as home mortgages. See id. For the purposes of this Note, "thrift" will be used
interchangeably with "savings and loan".
2. See H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 291, 294, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 90 [hereinafter House Report].
3. See Yang, Gleckman, Miller, Ivey & Carson, The S&L Mess-and How to Fix it,
Bus. Wk., Oct. 31, 1988, at 131; cf. S. Pizzo, M. Fricker & P. Muolo, Inside Job: The
Looting of America's Savings and Loans 25 (1989) [hereinafter Inside Job] ("starting a
small community-based savings and loan bordered on performing community service-
local people pooling their resources to assure there would be a safe place for their savings
and a source for home loans").
Originally, thrifts were only authorized to extend mortgages on property located
within a fifty-mile radius of the home office. See House Report, supra note 2, at 293,
reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 89. By 1983, most geographical
restrictions were lifted and most thrifts were permitted to lend nationwide. See id.
4. See Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, Enhancing the Value of the Thrift Franchise: A
Possible Solution for the Dilemma of the FSLIC?, 37 Cath. U.L. Rev. 385, 393 (1988).
5. See Budget Issues for Fiscal Year 1983: Hearings before the Comm. on the Budget
of the House ofRepresentatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1982) [hereinafter Budget Hear-
ings] (statement of Andrew S. Carron, Research Associate, Brookings Institution).
6. See Clark, et. al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. Law. 1013, 1019 (May
1990) [hereinafter Regulation ofSavings Associations]. In fact, it was so easy for thrifts to
make a profit that some argue that the industry previously ran by a 3-6-3 rule: pay
depositors three percent interest, charge borrowers six percent interest, and tee off on the
golf course by three in the afternoon. See Rudolph, Finally the Bill has Come Due, Time,
Feb. 20, 1989, at 73.
7. See Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. Law. 1883, 1883 (June
1990).
8. See Fix the Thrifts, or Pay and Pay, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1989, at A26, col. 1.
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cline. As a result, by the late 1980s the industry was in a dire financial
condition.
This Note examines the causes of the thrift industry's demise. Part I
examines the industry from 1966 to 1980. Part II analyzes the restruc-
turing of the thrift industry throughout the 1980s, including the effects of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 and the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. This Note concludes that
the thrift crisis was caused by inherent structural problems within the
industry, congressional carelessness and regulatory lapses.
I. THE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND FROM 1966 TO 1980
A. Interest Rate Regulation
Because of rising interest rates throughout the mid-1960s, thrifts were
faced with an earnings decline.9 Since thrifts' investments were restricted
to fixed-rate, long-term mortgages, the industry's income level remained
stable, but its expenses-the interest paid on deposits-fluctuated to re-
flect market rates.'0 In 1966, in an effort to insulate the thrift industry
from interest rate fluctuations," Congress extended to thrifts the interest
rate ceilings embodied in Regulation Q.12 Regulation Q "specifically re-
fers to the interest-rate regulations of the Federal Reserve"' 3 and had
previously applied only to commercial banks. 14
The interest rate ceiling imposed on thrifts under Regulation Q was set
higher than the ceiling imposed on commercial banks. 15 Depositors were
9. See White, The S&L Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and
Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S57, S61
(1991) [hereinafter White I]; L. White, The Debacle of the S&Ls in the United States:
Some Cautionary Lessons for the Regulation of Financial Institutions 8-9 (1990) (unpub-
lished) [hereinafter White II] (on fie at Fordham Law Review).
10. See White II, supra note 9, at 17-20.
11. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1019.
12. See Act of Sept. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (1966). Regulation Q
limited the interest rate that thrifts could pay on deposits. See id.
13. R. Brumbaugh, Thrifts Under Siege 14 (1988).
14. See L. Ritter & W. Silber, Principles of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets
89 (5th ed. 1985). Commercial banks were originally subjected to Regulation Q in re-
sponse to the banking system collapse of 1933. See id. Legislators reasoned that the high
interest expense associated with excessive interest rate competition in attracting deposits
during the 1920s negatively affected the banking industry. See id. To compensate for this
higher expense, banks invested in high yielding, risky ventures that weakened the overall
banking system. See id. Regulation Q was thus enacted to prevent similar competition in
the future. See Financial Market Deregulation, Am. Banker, Mar. 13, 1984, at 8.
15. See A. Carron, The Plight of the Thrift Institutions 5 (1982). In 1970, the differ-
entia was 0.50%, but in 1973 it was cut to 0.25%. See G. Krefetz, All About Saving 21
(1987). Indeed, in 1981 commercial banks could pay 5.25%, while savings-and-loans
were allowed to pay 5.50% interest on deposits. See Scharff, The Savings Revolution,
Time, June 8, 1981, at 60.
Prior to 1966 the interest rate limit on commercial banks' deposits rose with the mar-
ket rate of interest, and thus commercial banks were able to remain very competitive with
thrifts. See A. Carron, supra, at 5. Indeed, thrifts were forced to offer rates in excess of
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therefore encouraged to invest in thrifts rather than commercial banks in
hopes of ensuring a steady flow of funds for mortgage lending. 6 In fact,
depositors had few investment alternatives other than the thrift indus-
try 7 as unregulated investment vehicles, such as money market ac-
counts, were unavailable until the early 1970s.18
B. The Economic Environment
Inflation19 during the 1970s factored into the thrift industry's demise.
In 1970, the consumer price index ("CPI"),20 the primary measure of
inflation, rose to 5.9%2 ' due to increased domestic spending,' coupled
with a near capacity economy. 23 The Nixon Administration instituted
wage and price controls as a combatant measure,24 but they were eventu-
those offered by commercial banks to compensate for the customer's inconvenience asso-
ciated with thrift's inability to offer consumer services, such as checking accounts, that
were available at commercial banks. See id.
16. See S. Rep. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 236, 238-39 [hereinafter Senate Report]; Benston, Federal Regulation of
Banking:. Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 13 Issues Bank Reg. (BAI) No. 4, at 23-
24 (Winter 1983) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Banking file) (Regulation Q was extended to
thrifts "as [a] means of keeping funds flowing into mortgages"). By extending Regulation
Q to thrifts, Congress also intended to encourage home ownership by enabling thrifts to
offer lower rates to home buyers. See Heinemann, The Great Money Migration, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1983, § 3, at 4, col. 6.
17. In 1970, the federal government further limited the investment options available
by raising the minimum investment denomination of United States Treasury Bills to
$10,000, an amount beyond the means of most depositors. See White I, supra note 9, at
S63.
18. See id., at S64. Money market funds achieved great success in attracting deposi-
tors in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
19. Inflation is an "abnormal increase in available currency and credit beyond the
proportion of available goods, resulting in a sharp and continuing rise in price levels."
The American Heritage Dictionary 674 (1978).
Regulation Q's low interest rate ceilings exacerbated each inflationary period. See Sen-
ate Report, supra note 16, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
239-40. Because the return that savers earned in banks was negative after considering
taxes and inflation, Regulation Q's low interest rate ceilings actually discouraged people
from saving and encouraged spending. See id.; G. Krefetz, supra note 15, at 37.
20. As a measure of inflation, the CPI attempts to quantify the change in price for an
indexed set of goods and services bought by the average consumer. See Blacks Law Dic-
tionary 287 (5th ed. 1979).
21. See G. Wilson, Inflation: Causes, Consequences and Cures 33 (1982). In 1965,
the CPI measured 1.7%. See id.
22. See Isaac, Casting Blame Only Diverts Attention from S&L Cleanup, Am. Banker,
July 26, 1990, at 4. The Johnson Administration's fiscal policy most criticized as being
inflationary was the decision to fund the Vietnam War without collecting sufficient taxes
to pay for it. See N. Eichler, The Thrift Debacle 31 (1989); L. Lindberg & C. Maier, The
Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches and Interna-
tional Case Studies 31-32 (1985); G. Wilson, supra note 21, at 33; Cf. M. Stich, supra note
1, at 11 (credit crunches occurred because government funded the Vietnam War without
raising taxes). Inflation resulted when the Federal Reserve subsequently increased the
money supply to compensate for the resulting deficit. See N. Eichler, supra at 31.
23. See F. Balderston, Thrifts in Crisis: Structural Transformation of the Savings and
Loan Industry 4 (1985); L. Lindberg & C. Maier, supra note 22, at 31-32.
24. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 34.
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ally removed. By 1974 the CPI reached twelve percent.25 After falling
to 5.8% in 1976, the CPI increased steadily each year until 1980.26
In 1979, in an effort to combat inflation, the Federal Reserve restricted
the money supply, sending interest rates, a reflection of the cost of funds,
soaring.27 Although there have been four periods of high and volatile
interest rates since the mid-1960s,28 none has had more impact on the
thrift industry than the 1979 to 1980 period.
C. Disintermediation
Thrifts and other depository institutions, like investment banks and
insurance companies, are "financial intermediaries," entities that receive
financial assets (like deposits) and invest them in firms in need of funds
(like borrowers). During periods of high market interest rates thrifts ex-
perienced "disintermediation," a phenomenon whereby market interest
rates rise above government imposed rate ceilings,2 9 causing depositors to
withdraw funds and invest them in instruments that provide a higher
return.30 The outflow of deposits from thrifts severely limited the
amount of funds available to make loans3 and to meet expenses. 32 After
witnessing three periods of disintermediation from the mid-1960s to mid-
25. See id., at 34; L. Lindberg & C. Maier, supra note 22, at 33. The Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") induced an energy crisis in 1973 and 1974
that also contributed to the 1974 CPI surge. See F. Balderston, supra note 23, at 5;
Willax, Pundits Ignore the Real Villain in S&L Crisis: Inflation, Am. Banker, Mar. 9,
1989, at 4.
26. See G. Wilson, supra note 21, at 33. The United States experienced successive
years of double-digit inflation in 1979 and 1980 when the inflation rate reached 13.3%
and 12.4%, respectively. See L. Ritter & W. Silber, supra note 14, at 168.
27. See Simpson, Developments in the U.S. Financial System Since the Mid-1970s, 74
Fed. Reserve Bull. 1, 4 (1988). The Federal Reserve concentrated on money supply ag-
gregates and allowed interest rates to find their own levels. See F. Balderston, supra note
23, at 56. This change enabled the prime rate to reach 20% by 1981. See S&L Crisis,
Hearing of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Comm., Oct. 1, 1990, at 2
[hereinafter S&L Crisis Hearing] (testimony of Donald Regan, former Secretary of the
Treasury) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file).
28. See House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, The Report of the
Interagency Task Force on Thrift Institutions, H.R. Doc. No. 14, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4
(1980) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. These periods were: 1966, 1969-70, 1973-74 and
1979-80. See id. The thrift industry also witnessed varying degrees of disintermediation
during these periods. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of Regulation Q's interest-rate ceilings, see supra notes 9-18 and
accompanying text.
30. See Mahoney & White, The Thrift Industry in Transition, 71 Fed. Reserve Bull.
137, 141 (1985).
31. See Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 203 (statement of Richard Pratt, former
Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board); Benston, supra note 16, at 216.
32. See Consumer Financial Services Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 8981 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings] (statement of Fernand J. St Germain, Chairman, Subcommittee); cf Task
Force Report, supra note 28, at 4-7 ("advances have played a crucial role in satisfying
short-term liquidity needs").
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1970s,33 in 1978, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"),3
then the thrift regulatory body, authorized thrifts to offer money market
savings certificates that were tied to current market interest rates. 35 This
device required a six-month minimum deposit 36 and a ten thousand dol-
lar minimum balance which many small savers could not afford.31 It
therefore had limited success3 in stemming the outflow of funds from
thrifts.
39
II. THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE THRIFT INDUSTRY
A. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980
In an attempt to restructure the thrift industry, Congress enacted the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
("DIDMCA"). ° Among other things, DIDMCA attempted a limited
economic deregulation of the thrift industry. It authorized thrifts to
place up to twenty percent of their assets in short-term,"1 market-rate42
investments, thereby increasing both industry-wide liquidity and earn-
33. See Hearings, supra note 32, at 78 (statement of Fernand J. St Germain, Chair-
man, Subcommittee). During these early periods of disintermediation, thrifts had a
choice of two unappealing options to meet their liquidity needs: either borrow expen-
sively in the open market or sell assets. See Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 3-4.
Selling thrift assets (long-term mortgages) in periods of rising interest rates generally
resulted in losses, however. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
34. The FHLBB is the independent agency of the federal government's executive
branch responsible for chartering federal savings-and-loans and regulating all associa-
tions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). See
M. Stich, supra note 1, at 210.
35. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 9; A. Gart, Banks, Thrifts, and Insurance Com-
panies 14 (1985).
36. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 9. In early 1980, the FHLBB also authorized
thrifts to offer 30-month small-saver certificates on terms similar to the six-month certifi-
cate. See id.
37. See Seiders, Changing Patterns of Housing Finance, 67 Fed. Reserve Bull. 461,
463 (1981).
38. In 1979, 20% of the total balances in all thrift accounts were composed of money-
market savings certificates, see R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 40, and rose to 36% in
1980. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 45. Paying market interest rates on these bal-
ances, however, severely strained thrift industry earnings. See infra notes 73-75 and ac-
companying text.
39. See Seiders, supra note 37, at 463. In 1978, thrifts were allowed to offer their
money market at an interest rate that was .25% higher than commercial banks, which
were offering a comparable account. See Moran, Thrift Institutions in Recent Years, 68
Fed. Reserve Bull. 725, 729 (1982). In March 1979, however, "this differential was made
effective only at lower levels of interest rates, and deposit growth at savings and loans...
weakened considerably relative to that at commercial banks." Id.
40. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 [hereinafter DIDMCA] (codified at various sections of
12 U.S.C.).
41. These investments include such things as consumer loans, commercial paper and
corporate debt securities. See id. § 401(c)(2), 94 Stat. at 153 (codified at various sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
42. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 66.
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ings potential. Additionally, it authorized thrifts to offer Negotiable Or-
der of Withdrawal checking accounts ("NOW"),43 trust services' and
credit cards.45 Legislators reasoned that depositors would be more will-
ing to accept lower deposit rates in exchange for "one stop" banking
convenience.' These measures gave thrifts increased flexibility in gener-
ating revenue. 47
DIDMCA also increased the level of federal deposit insurance cover-
age from $40,000 to $100,000.48 This increase in the level of deposit in-
surance effectively guaranteed the liabilities of insolvent thrifts. 49 It
enabled thrift management to gamble with depositor's funds, confident
that the government would bear any losses.50 Increased deposit insur-
ance muted depositor motivation to investigate the solvency of thrift in-
stitutions.5 Before deposit insurance, thrifts were self-regulated; if
depositors felt that an institution had become too risky, they would with-
draw their funds.52 The advent of federal deposit insurance, however,
removed this self-limiting feature. 3 Commentators have argued that the
increased risk to taxpayers associated with federal deposit insurance
should have been mitigated by increased regulatory supervision.5 4 In-
stead, however, the premium thrifts paid to the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC")" for deposit insurance was set
43. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 303, 94 Stat. at 146 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1988)).
44. See id. § 403, 94 Stat. at 156-58 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988)).
45. See id. § 402, 94 Stat. at 155-56 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)
(1988)).
46. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 66.
47. See P. Rose, The Changing Structure of American Banking 308-09 (1987).
48. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 308(a)-(c), 94 Stat. at 147-48 (codified as
amended at various sections of 12 U.S.C.). The $60,000 increase in deposit insurance has
caused a significant amount of controversy. See History of a Blank Check, Wall St. J.,
May 24, 1990, at A14, col. 1; White II, supra note 9, at 10; Who is to Blame for the S & L
Crisis?, Fortune Mar. 13, 1989, at 152; cf. S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 15 (state-
ment of Donald Regan, former Secretary of the Treasury) (deposit insurance increase was
made in the "dead of night"). The increase was made with little debate, no congressional
hearings, see Inside Job, supra note 3, at 11, and over the objections of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). See Isaac, supra note 22 at 4.
49. See e.g. R. Kormendi, V. Bernard, S. Pirrong & E. Snyder, Crisis Resolution in
the Thrift Industry 13-14 (1989) [hereinafter Crisis Resolution] (comparing deposit insur-
ance to a put option, requiring the "government to pay out assistance if the asset base of a
savings and loan falls below a certain level").
50. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 80.
51. See Sussman, Economics of Thrift Crisis Suggest Need to Reinforce Market Disci-
pline Over Managers, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 30 (Jan. 2, 1989).
52. Cf id. ("The decision to provide deposit insurance set a higher priority of giving
small depositors confidence than on exposing thrifts to depositor scrutiny.").
53. See Financial Market Deregulation, supra note 14, at 12; cf P. Rose, supra note
47, at 366 (deposit insurance "has reduced the effectiveness of the self-regulating powers
of the market"). Holders of insured accounts had little or no reason to be concerned with
the quality of the institution or to demand an increased return commensurate with an
increased risk. See Scott, supra note 7, at 1886.
54. See infra notes 148-159 and accompanying text.
55. For a complete discussion of the origins of FSLIC insurance, see Note, Too Many
S306 [Vol. 59
by statute and "was the same rate for all insured institutions, regardless
of the riskiness of their assets, the size of their equity capital, or the capa-
bility of their management."56 Furthermore, federal deposit insurance
was available to state-chartered institutions,57 even though such institu-
tions were not adequately regulated by the federal government.5
Finally, because Congress believed that Regulation Q failed to curb
disintermediation,59 DIDMCA established the Depository Institutions
Deregulation Committee ("DIDC") ° to phase out the artificial interest
rate constraints of Regulation Q.61 Congress believed that Regulation Q
impeded the thrift industry's ability to compete with uninsured invest-
ment vehicles for deposits,62 and therefore failed to provide a steady flow
of funds for mortgage lending. Regulation Q also tended to discriminate
against small depositors because they could not afford the minimum bal-
ance requirement of the thrift money market, nor did they have access to
higher yielding uninsured money market mutual fuinds.63 Small savers,
Consonants and not Enough Consonance." The Development of the S&L Regulatory Frame-
work, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death
and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S263, S281-83 (1991).
56. Scott, supra note 7, at 1886; see also Crisis Resolution, supra note 49, at 13 ("a
key fault with the insurance system is that FSLIC charged all savings and loans (regard-
less of their riskiness) a flat premium calculated as a percent of all deposits").
57. For a discussion of the availability of federal deposit insurance to state-chartered
thrifts see Note, supra note 55, at S282.
58. See Solving the FSLIC Crisis, Panel Meeting at the 1989 Washington Seminar,
May 15, 1989, at 8 [hereinafter Panel Meeting] (testimony of Sen. Donald Riegle, Chair-
man, Senate Banking Committee) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file); National Press
Foundation Forum on the Savings and Loan Crisis "Where Was Congress?" Apr. 24,
1989, at 6 [hereinafter Forum] (statement of Rep. Jim Leach) (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Fednews file); See also S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 50 (testimony of Richard
Pratt, former Chairman, FHLBB) (federal insurer should have been able to control the
risks it was insuring).
59. See Senate Report, supra note 16, at 3-4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 238-40.
60. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 203(a), 94 Stat. at 142 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3502 (1988)).
61. See id. § 204(a), 94 Stat. at 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988)). DIDMCA
mandated that the DIDC phase out and ultimately eliminate the interest rate ceilings,
which "may be paid on deposits and accounts as rapidly as economic conditions war-
rant." Id. Such phase-out and elimination were to occur within six years of DIDMCA's
enactment. See id. § 205(a), 94 Stat. at 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3504 (1988)).
Congress ignored previous calls for the removal of interest rate ceilings and the expan-
sion of thrift asset powers. After the thrift industry's first bout with disintermediation in
the late 1960s, Congress authorized a study of the industry by the FHLBB. See S&Ls--
Don't Blame Deregulation, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at D7 (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Wpost file). The FHLBB recommended the removal of interest rate ceilings and ex-
panded asset powers, but Congress failed to act. See id. In 1971, similar recommenda-
tions were made by the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation
(Hunt Commission), but again Congress ignored the recommendations. See A. Carron,
supra note 15, at 8; see also A. Gart, supra note 35, at 12-13 (discussing recommendations
of Hunt Commission and their incorporation into DIDMCA).
62. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 202(a), 94 Stat. at 142 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1988)).
63. See Financial Market Deregulation, supra note 14, at 8.
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therefore, were prevented from obtaining a market rate.64
B. State of the Industry: 1980 to 1982
1. Severe Disintermediation
Although DIDMCA authorized the newly formed DIDC65 to phase
out interest rate ceilings, Congress failed to provide the DIDC with spe-
cific guidance in this regard.6 6 As a result, artificial interest rate ceilings
remained in place and disintermediation remained prevalent during 1980
and 1981.67 In 1981, total deposit outflows from thrifts exceeded deposit
inflows by $25.5 billion.6" Regulation Q further failed to protect thrifts
from increased competition from Wall Street investment houses,6 9 which
offered investment devices, such as money market funds,70 that were not
subject to artificial rate ceilings. Consequently, in both 1981 and 1982
Federal Home Loan Banks7 were required to make loans to thrifts to
64. See id.
65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 56. Even the legislation itself was subject to
varying interpretations: "Savings and loan associations viewed this new legislation as a
six-year extension of Regulation Q and the housing differential.... On the other hand,
commercial banks saw it as attaining their long sought goal to end the housing differen-
tial." Id. (quoting Depository Institutions Deregulation Comm.: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1980))
(statement of Edwin J. Brooks, Jr., president, U.S. League of Savings Associations) (alter-
ations in original).
67. A. Carron, The Rescue of the Thrift Industry 2-3 (1983) [hereinafter Rescue].
68. See Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 203 (statement of Richard Pratt, former
Chairman, FHLBB). For seven consecutive quarters beginning in January 1981, savings-
and-loans had total net outflows of $45.7 billion. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 71.
In 1981, FSLIC-insured associations' total mortgage loans were $52.1 billion, the low-
est lending volume since 1974, and 27% less than that of 1980. See Budget Hearings,
supra note 5, at 203 (statement of Richard Pratt, former Chairman, FHLBB). The asso-
ciation's share of total new mortgage loans dropped from approximately 50% during
most of the 1970s to 26% in the first three quarters of 1981. See id. at 203-4.
69. See Benston, supra note 16, at 25; see also McCord, The Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, 6 Issues Bank Reg. (BAI) No. 2, at 6 (Autumn 1982) (Wall Street attracted
some of the thrift industry's most affluent customers). Balances in money market mutual
funds increased from $6.4 billion in 1978 to $150.9 billion in 1981. See Financial Market
Deregulation, supra note 14, at 8.
70. See Hearings, supra note 32, at 77-78 (statement of Fernand J. St Germain, Chair-
man, Subcommittee). Money market funds are liquid and offer high rates. See LaFalce,
Banking in the Eighties, 37 Bus. Law. 839, 844 (1982). Although such funds are not
federally insured, they have been perceived as safe due to their composition of short-term
corporate and government securities. See G. Krefetz, supra note 15, at 57; Scharff, supra
note 15, at 60.
71. Congress established the Federal Home Loan Bank System in 1932 to afford
home financing institutions a central credit facility, as well as to serve as a secondary
liquidity source to its members during heavy withdrawal periods. See Savings Institution
Sourcebook 15 (1984). All FSLIC-insured savings institutions were required to join the
Federal Home Loan Bank System. See id. Most thrifts were thus members of the system
and eligible to receive loans; total outstanding loans to thrifts grew from $6 billion in
1966 to over $40 billion by January 1980. See Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 4.
Such loans were tied to money market rates. See F. Balderston, supra note 23, at 55.
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avert an industry-wide liquidity crisis?72
2. Interest Rate Mismatch
As market interest rates rose throughout the late 1970s and early
1980s, the spread between rates paid to depositors and rates charged on
long-term mortgage commitments narrowed.73 By the second half of
1981, the industry's average cost of funds (deposits and borrowings) was
11.5%, while the average asset portfolio yield was only ten percent.7 4 As
a result, more than eighty percent of FSLIC-insured associations sus-
tained a net loss in 1981. 75
To prevent such losses in the future, the DIDMCA preempted state
usury laws that restricted interest rates chargeable on loans and mort-
gages. 76 In April 1981, the FHLBB adopted regulations allowing federal
thrifts to issue Adjustable Rate Mortgages ("ARM").' Because ARM
yields adjust to reflect market interest rates,78 regulators hoped thrifts
would be able to match revenues with expenses.79 This move, however,
72. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 71; G. Krefetz, supra note 15, at 24.
73. See Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 402.
This narrowing was caused by the increased interest expense associated with the 1978
issuance of the thrift money market savings certificate. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note
13, at 40-43. Commentators argue that thrift industry deregulation was performed back-
wards. See S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 44 (statement of Richard Pratt, former
Chairman, FHLBB); Wayne, Savings Institutions Reshaping Operation in Face of Big
Losses, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1981, at D4, col. 3. Thrifts were authorized to pay high
market interest rates on deposits beginning in 1978, yet they were not authorized to invest
such deposits at the market rate until 1980, when DIDMCA granted thrifts increased
investment powers. See supra notes 4047 and accompanying text.
The thrift industry found itself in an unfamiliar position compared to previous decades
when passbook rates were set by the federal government and mortgage ceilings were set
by state usury laws. The industry in the regulated environment of the mid-1970s main-
tained a spread between revenues and expenses averaging from 1.5% to 1.8%. See
Wayne, supra, at D4, col. 2.
74. See Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 201-02 (statement of Richard T. Pratt, for-
mer Chairman, FHLBB); M. Stich, supra note 1, at 13. In 1981 and 1982 alone, the
savings-and-loan industry lost approximately $9 billion dollars. See House Report, supra
note 2, at 296, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 92. Such losses
resulted in an industry return on assets in 1981 and 1982 of negative 0.73% and negative
0.65%, respectively. See id. Moreover, in 1981, 1982 and 1983 there were 81, 252 and
102 thrift failures, respectively. See id.
75. See Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 202 (statement of Richard T. Pratt, former
Chairman FHLBB); see also M. Stich, supra note 1, at 13 (85% of FSLIC-insured institu-
tions operated at a loss in final six months of 1981).
76. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
1735f-7 (1988)).
77. See eg., Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 205 (statement of Richard T. Pratt,
former Chairman HLBB) (in 1981, the "Board adopted regulations which allow a truly
flexible, interest-rate sensitive mortgage instrument"). Some states, including California,
already allowed their own state-chartered thrifts to issue ARMs. See White I, supra note
9, at S63-64.
78. See Mahoney and White, supra note 30, at 146.
79. See Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 205 (statement of Richard T. Pratt, former
Chairman, FHLBB).
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"was long overdue."'80 Because of disintermediation and heavy industry
losses, thrifts lacked the funds to dedicate to ARMs. In addition, the
maturity gap between short-term deposits and long-term loans exacer-
bated the problem. Furthermore, borrower reluctance to pre-pay low
rate mortgages during periods of rising interest rates made it increasingly
difficult for thrifts to turn such mortgages into higher yielding assets,
such as ARMs.8'
At this time, thrifts considered selling older fixed-rate mortgages in the
secondary market to increase liquidity. Higher interest rates, however,
generally diminished the market value of thrifts' low-yielding mort-
gages, 2 making thrifts hesitant to engage in such sales.8 3 Further, the
loss incurred by selling these loans could have diminished thrifts' already
weakened 4  capital ratios below minimum regulatory standards,8 5
thereby increasing the likelihood of regulatory intervention.
3. Regulatory Lapse and a Policy of Forbearance
In the early 1980s, industry-wide net worth 6 plummeted due to the
unfavorable interest rate spread. 7 Because the FSLIC lacked sufficient
80. See White II, supra note 9, at 10.
81. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 33; Willax, supra note 25, at 4. Such inability
resulted from the high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which decreased
the number of early mortgage prepayments. See Moran, supra note 39, at 728. "Periods
of high interest rates slow portfolio turnover further, as people defer home construction
and purchases until rates decline. The rate of return on the portfolio increases only
slowly under such conditions." Savings Institutions Sourcebook, supra note 71, at 15. In
1977, for example, mortgage turnover was approximately 14%, but after the interest rate
increase from 1979 to 1982, turnover fell to approximately seven percent. See Rescue,
supra note 67, at 4.
82. See Farnsworth, U.S. Aid for Thrift Units Poses Questions of Need, N.Y. Times,
July 2, 1981, at D6, col. 1. The decrease in asset value was due to the below market
return they were receiving on their long-term mortgages. See Regulations of Savings
Associations, supra note 6, at 1019; Farnsworth, supra, at D6, col. 1. Because thrift liabil-
ities remained either unchanged or increased, such liabilities became increasingly difficult
to meet with assets generating below market returns. See Benston, supra note 16, at 24.
Depository institutions are not required to mark to market their loan portfolios, but
rather are permitted to value their loans at historical cost. See G. Kaufman & R.
Kormendi, Deregulating Financial Services 132 (1986). Thus the book value of such
loans was higher than the corresponding market values. Indeed, "take a fully-amortizing
25-year mortgage made at the end of 1975 at an interest rate of 9%, the average then
prevailing. Putting shifts in prepayment possibilities or in the borrower's credit risk, that
loan would, in the 15%-world of late-1980, be subject to a market discount of about
32%." See Scott, supra note 7, at 1887 n.21.
83. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 43.
84. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
85. See A. Gart, supra note 35, at 86-87.
86. Net worth (or capital) is the dollar value of a thrift's total assets less total liabili-
ties. See M. Stich, supra note 1, at 221.
87. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 94. A thrift's solvency was primarily determined by the ratio of its net
worth to its total assets. See Moran, supra note 39, at 731. When the net-worth ratio fell
below FHLBB established levels, see infra note 90, for a certain time period, regulatory
agencies were supposed to intervene. This regulatory intervention could have included
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funds to close insolvent thrifts and pay insured depositors, the FHLBB
instituted a policy of forbearance hoping that interest rates would de-
crease and return thrifts to profitability."8 This policy of forbearance
enabled thrifts to "technically avoid insolvency" 9 while actually remain-
ing insolvent.
Consistent with this policy, the FHLBB initiated a reduction in capital
standards, 90 lowering the required amount of ownership capital at risk,
while enabling thrifts to lend or invest at increasingly high levels. 9' The
depositors92 and the federal government 93 would have borne any losses
beyond thrift owners' initial capital investment. Decreased capital re-
quirements "enabled institutions to undertake explosive asset and liabil-
ity growth without increasing the institution's capital base."'
anything from forced mergers with financially sound institutions to possible liquidation.
See Moran, supra note 39, at 731.
88. See Findings of Booz Allen & Hamilton Study of FHLBB: Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Gen. Oversight and Investigations of the House of Representatives Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1987). One commenta-
tor estimates that industry net worth in 1980 was negative S17.5 billion, based on the
market value of assets and liabilities. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 44. The FSLIC,
however, only had reserves of $6.5 billion. See id.
89. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 94.
90. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. The minimum capital requirement
was reduced from five percent to four percent in 1980 and then to three percent in 1982.
See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin-
News at 94. Lower capital standards decreased the total investment that thrift owners
were required to maintain as a buffer against losses. See G. Kaufman & R. Kormend
supra note 82, at 134; White II, supra note 9. Capital serves other useful functions as
well, such as "enhancing the safety of depositor funds, helping maintain public confi-
dence in the financial system, and supporting the expansion of banks and thrifts." See
House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
at 94.
Minimum capital requirements, as well as investment and liability restrictions, are ex-
amples of safety and soundness regulations. See White II, supra note 9, at 3-4. These
regulations were designed to protect depositors and the deposit-insurance fund from
losses. See id. at 4. The liberal availability of deposit insurance increased the importance
of safety and soundness regulation. See id. at 3. Conversely, economic regulations, such
as interest-rate regulation and branch-location restrictions, were designed to shield thrifts
from competition, as well as to ensure low-cost financing for home buyers. See id.
91. See White II, supra note 9, at 5-7; Nash, Who to Thank for the Thrift Crisis, N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1988, § 3, at 14, col. 2. Because of the concept of limited personal liabil-
ity, thrift owners' losses were limited to their initial capital investment. See N. Eichler,
supra note 22, at 76; White I, supra note 9, at S58.
92. "Uninsured depositors are not a significant number. There are [approximately]
one or two percent of the deposits in an insolvent savings and loan that are above one
hundred thousand dollars." See White I, supra note 9, at 561.
93. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 76.
94. See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 409. Many thrift owners believed
that rapid growth was the easiest manner in which to generate new capital and regain
profitability. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298-99, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News at 94-95. A five percent capital level meant, for example, that
thrift owners had to maintain a $1 safety cushion for every $20 of loans; but by lowering
the standard to three percent, institutions could lend $33 with the same S1 cushion. See
Nash, supra note 91, § 3, at 14, col. 2.
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The FHLBB also made it easier for thrifts to meet these reduced capi-
tal standards through creative accounting techniques. The FHLBB
granted thrifts the option of following either Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles ("GAAP") or Regulatory Accounting Principles
("RAP") for the purposes of financial statement preparation." Report-
ing under RAP often produced a more favorable thrift net worth than
under GAAP without producing any real economic difference.96 The ap-
plication of RAP understated the number of thrifts considered insolvent
for regulatory purposes.97  RAP, for example, allowed thrifts to amor-
tize losses on the sale of assets over the remaining life of the asset98 in-
stead of recognizing the entire loss in the period of the sale, as required
under GAAP.99 Moreover, thrifts exploited the weaknesses of both RAP
and GAAP standards to present an illusion of financial strength that did
not exist. GAAP generally required thrifts to value assets, liabilities and
95. See A. Gart, supra note 35, at 99. While the FHLBB was responsible for deter-
mining RAP, the Financial Accounting Standards Board primarily promulgates GAAP.
See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 36-39. The differences between RAP and GAAP
are so significant that commentators argue that such differences played a major role in
the thrift crisis. See House Report supra note 2, at 297, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong
& Admin. News at 93; R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 39; Breeden, Thumbs on the
Scale: The Role that Accounting Practices Played in the Savings and Loan Crisis, in An-
nual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Trans-
figuration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S57 (1991).
RAP was generally more liberal than GAAP with respect to income recognition. See
A. Gart, supra note 35, at 99. Some argue that allowing more liberal accounting proce-
dures further debilitated an accounting system ("GAAP") that already allowed thrifts to
overstate their financial positions. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 71-72; see also White
I, supra note 9, at 560 (advocating change to market-value accounting system).
96. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 94. RAP "masked the true magnitude of the thrift industry's woes and the level
of insolvency of the FSLIC." Id. RAP accomplished this by boosting reported net worth
through balance sheet adjustments above what it would have been otherwise. See Moran,
supra note 39, at 731. Such adjustments, however, did little to decrease thrift losses or to
permit them to absorb losses in any real way. See id. RAP therefore "represent[ed] 'solu-
tions' in an accounting sense rather than in basic economic terms." Id.
97. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 44; cf. Isaac, supra note 22, at 4 (insolvent
thrifts were allowed to continue operation due to regulatory accounting techniques). By
1984, thrift industry net worth computed under RAP was nine billion dollars higher than
that computed under GAAP. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94; R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 44. In other
words, thrift industry capital, its buffer against loss, was overstated by nine billion dol-
lars. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News at 94. The difference grew to $13.3 billion by 1986 and $14.9 billion by 1988.
See id.
98. See G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi, supra note 82, at 132; Moran, supra note 39, at
733.
99. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 43-44. The principle reason this provision
was adopted was to encourage thrifts to restructure their asset portfolios by selling older
fixed-rate mortgages and acquiring higher yielding assets, such as adjustable-rate mort-
gages. See id.; Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 428. Deferred losses grew
from six million dollars in 1980, see Cope, Did Pratt's Piloting Sink S&L Industry?, Am.




off-balance sheet items at historical cost, not at current market value.100
RAP, conversely, permitted thrifts to include in their net worth calcula-
tion appraised equity capital,10' which represented the unrealized appre-
ciation of thrift assets."0 2 As a result, thrifts were permitted to include a
favorable increase in asset value in their net worth calculation without
recognizing the unfavorable unrealized depreciation of other assets, such
as long-term mortgages. 10 3
In 1982, Congress enabled thrifts to further bolster their increasingly
endangered net worth through the issuance of net worth certificates, °0
capital instruments that were added to thrift net worth as a means of
"providing additional time for the regulatory agencies to arrange the fur-
ther consolidation of the industry."' 15 The FSLIC sold these certificates
to financially troubled thrifts in exchange for promissory notes and a por-
tion of the institution's future profits." Although net worth certificates
100. See White I, supra note 9, at S60; cf. N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 71 (GAAP does
not require adjustment to market value). GAAP thus allowed thrifts to mask their finan-
cial woes, particularly in the late 1970s when the market value of thrift long-term mort-
gages plunged. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. Thrifts were not required
under GAAP to recognize any losses or to include unrealized depreciation in their net
worth calculation for regulatory purposes. See White II, supra note 9, at 7. By 1982
most thrifts had a negative net worth when assets were valued at market. See Scott, supra
note 7, at 1887. One commentator estimates that by mid-1981, thrift assets at book value
were overstated by $86.5 billion. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 83.
101. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 94.
102. Appraised equity capital is the difference between the market value of property
like land and buildings and the book value. See Moran, supra note 39, at 732. Appraised
equity capital did not appear on thrift balance sheets, nor was it reported in the net worth
figure in thrift financial statements. See id. at 733. Instead, it was used by the regulatory
agencies in reviewing thrift's overall financial health. See id.
103. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. Appraised equity capital could
only be included in a thrift's regulatory net worth calculation once; on December 31,
1985, the permission to use this accounting procedure expired. See Moran, supra note 39,
at 733.
For a detailed discussion of other RAP techniques, see House Report, supra note 2, at
298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94; R. Brumbaugh, supra note
13, at 41-47; Moran, supra note 39, at 731-34.
104. See infra note 106. The net worth program was designed to aid thrifts whose
poor financial condition was due primarily to mortgage lending activities. See Long, Shil-
ling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 403-04.
105. See Rescue, supra note 67, at 16.
106. See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 404. This exchange increased
thrift net worth without a cash infusion by the FSLIC, thereby "cushion[ing] the impact
on the insurance funds." See Rescue, supra note 67, at 15. The three primary qualifica-
tions that a thrift had to meet to be eligible to receive capital certificates were losses in the
previous two quarters, a net worth less than or equal to three percent and investments in
residential mortgages aggregating at least 20% of its loans. See Gain-St Germain Depos-
itory Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 202B, 96 Stat. 1469, 1490 (1982)[hereinafter Gain-St Germain] (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988)).
Congressional members linked the net worth certificate program to the grant of addi-
tional and more flexible investment powers to the thrift industry under Garn-St Germain.
See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 403 n. 125. "To offer a net worth
guarantee program to the thrift institutions without simultaneously allowing them
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increased the thrifts' net worth,1"7 they had little positive effect on
earnings. 108
C. The Garn-St Gennain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
In passing the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
("Garn-St Germain")," °9 Congress again attempted to restructure the
thrift industry. Congress' intent was to ensure a high degree of future
home mortgage lending through strengthened financial institutions and a
revitalized housing industry." 0 First, and most importantly, it enabled
thrifts to further diversify their asset portfolios."' Second, Garn-St
Germain created an account that was competitive and comparable to
money market mutual funds." 2 Third, it conferred new powers to the
FHLBB to deal with financially troubled thrifts." 3  Fourth, Garn-St
Germain created a program to aid financially troubled thrifts." 4 Finally,
it removed the interest rate differential between thrifts and commercial
broader lending power is to tie our guarantee power to a set of institutions which will not
be able to earn their way out of their current problems." Id. at 403-04 n. 125 (quoting 128
Cong. Rec. 27,349 (1982) (statement of Rep. Frank)).
107. Net worth certificates were considered capital even under GAAP. See Long, Shil-
ling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 403 n.125.
108. See Rescue, supra note 67, at 24.
109. See Garn-St Germain, supra note 106 (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
110. See id. at preamble.
111. Garn-St Germain facilitated asset diversification in six ways. First, Garn-St
Germain authorized thrifts to invest up to 40% of total assets in loans for nonresidential
real property. See Garn-St Germain, supra note 106, § 322, 96 Stat. at 1499 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B) (1988)). Second, it allowed thrifts to invest in
other thrifts' time deposits or savings accounts provided that the accounts were insured
by the federal government. See id. § 323, 96 Stat. at 1499-500 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(G) (1988)). Third, Garn-St Germain allowed thrifts to invest all
their assets in local or state government obligations. See id. § 324, 96 Stat. at 1500
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(H) (1988)). Fourth, it authorized thrifts
to invest up to 10% of total assets in commercial, corporate, business or agricultural
loans. See id. § 325, 96 Stat. at 1500 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(R)
(1988)). Fifth, Garn-St Germain allowed thrifts to invest up to 30% of total assets in
consumer loans. See id. § 329, 96 Stat. at 1502 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(c)(2)(B) (1988)). Finally, it authorized thrifts to invest up to 10% of total assets
in tangible personal property. See id. § 330, 96 Stat. at 1502 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1988)).
112. See Garn-St Germain, supra note 106, § 327, 96 Stat. at 1501 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c)(1)-(3) (1988)). The account was insured by the federal
government, was liquid and paid a market rate. See Banks Prepare for New Market-Rate
Deposit Account, Banking J., at 35, (Nov. 1982). Individuals were therefore able to obtain
benefits comparable to those of institutional investors. See infra notes 125-127 and ac-
companying text. In December 1982 alone, this new account attracted $43 billion in
funds, see Rescue, supra note 67, at 18, and helped to stem the massive disintermediation
that thrifts experienced in the 1980 to 1982 period. See supra notes 65-72 and accompa-
nying text.
113. See Garn-St Germain, supra note 106, § 123, 96 Stat. at 1483-85 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a (1988)).




D. State of the Industry: 1982 and Beyond
1. State-Chartered Thrifts Granted Broad Investment Powers
Since the Gan-St Germain Act liberalized federal restrictions on
thrifts, many state-chartered thrifts abandoned the state system and
joined the federal system.II6 In response, many states, California, Texas
and Florida in particular, granted thrifts investment powers that were far
more liberal than those authorized by Gain-St Germain. 7 Many state-
chartered thrifts were therefore able to abandon traditional home mort-
gage lending for riskier ventures, such as fast food restaurants, low-grade
corporate notes and commercial paper.118 The resulting high failure
rate among state-chartered institutions was commensurate with this in-
creased risk. 19 Because most state-chartered thrifts were federally in-
sured, a significant portion of FSLIC expenditures in the late 1980s went
to depositors of failed state institutions.'"
As a result of these expanded investment powers, management of both
state and federally-chartered thrifts, experienced in evaluating credit
risks associated with home mortgage loans, found itself evaluating credit
risks associated with complex investments.121 As a result, the industry
suffered increased losses due to credit failures outside the realm of tradi-
tional thrift investments. 22 Texas thrifts, for example, were particularly
hard hit when oil prices plunged in the mid-1980s, causing real estate
prices to decline.' 23 Therefore, thrifts that had either invested in or fi-
115. See id. § 326, 96 Stat. at 1500-01 (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
116. See F. Balderston, supra note 23, at 18.
117. See Sussman, supra note 51, at 29. By 1984, greater than one third of all states
had granted their state-chartered thrifts broader investment powers than those granted to
federally chartered thrifts. See House Report, supra note 2, at 297, reprinted in 1989 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News at 93. For example, under DIDMCA federally-chartered
thrifts could invest up to three percent of their assets in subsidiary service corporations.
See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 401(c)(4)(B), 94 Stat. at 154 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(c) (1988)). Some states, however, including California, allowed their state-
chartered thrifts to invest up to 100% of their assets in subsidiary service corporations
without placing any statutory investment restrictions on the service corporations. See
Cal. Fin. Code § 7252 (West 1989). Therefore, in theory, California-chartered thrifts
could invest up to 100% of their assets in directly owned real estate while federally-
chartered thrifts could invest only three percent. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 75.
118. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1021; Hayes, Thrift Units
on Coast Surging, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1984, at DI, col. 3.
119. See Panel Meeting, supra note 58, at 8-9 (testimony of Rep. LaFalce).
120. "Seventy percent of all FSLIC expenditures during 1988 went to pay for problems
created by high-risk, ill-supervised, state-chartered thrifts in California and Texas. Those
same two states absorbed 54 percent of FSLIC expenditures in 1987." House Report,
supra note 2, at 297, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 93.
121. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 122.
122. See House Report, supra note 2, at 299, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 95. A recession in the southwest severely compounded the thrift indus-
try's poor financial condition. See id.
123. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1019. The tax law change
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nanced real estate ventures were financially weakened by this market
price decline. 124
2. Brokered Deposits and Industry Growth
The removal of rate ceilings on deposits of $100,000 or more125 and
the increase in deposit insurance to $100,000126 created an influx of de-
posits beginning in 1982. Because thrifts could offer federally-insured
$100,000 accounts at market rates, Wall Street brokers funneled cash to
thrifts in $100,000 bundles called brokered deposits.' 27 The elimination
of the limitation on thrift holdings in brokered deposits 128 further con-
in 1986 removed many of the investment advantages associated with holding real estate,
thus causing a further price decline. See White I, supra note 9, at S67.
124. See White I, supra note 9, at S66-67. Much of the collateral that Texas thrifts
were holding, therefore, had fair market values below the book values of the correspond-
ing outstanding mortgage loans. When borrowers defaulted on those mortgages, thrifts
were stuck with losses for the difference.
125. See Sprague, Finger-Pointers Rewriting History of the S&L Crisis, Am. Banker,
Aug. 22, 1990, at 5.
126. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The reason that the increase to
$100,000 was so significant to the thrift industry dates back to 1970. See Sprague, Unre-
lated Series of Events Led to S & L Crisis, Am. Banker, May 3, 1984, at 9 [hereinafter
Series of Events]. When thrift industry regulators were confronted with the bailout of
Penn Central Railroad, they removed Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on deposits of
$100,000 or greater so that large banks could attract large deposits. See Sprague, supra,
note 125, at 5; Series of Events, supra, at 4. As a result, an institutional market was
established in which $100,000 bundles were deposited in government-insured accounts at
thrifts. See Seward & Zaitzeff, Insurability of Brokered Deposits: A Legislative Analysis,
39 Bus. Law. 1705, 1713 (1984). Although this institutional market was available to
investors in 1980, it did not become prevalent in the industry until 1982.
127. See Pusey, Fast Money and Fraud, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1989, § 6, at 32, col. 3.
From January 1982 to December 1983, brokered deposits in FSLIC institutions grew
from $3 billion to $30 billion. See FDIC and FHLBB Final Rule on Brokered Deposits, 42
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 6 (Apr. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Bnabnk file).
Many individual thrifts grew at double-digit rates; one thrift used brokered deposits to
grow from $72 million in 1981 to $820 million in 1985. See S&L Crisis Hearing, supra
note 27, at 27 (statement of Rep. Joseph Kennedy II).
From 1983 through 1986 total thrift liabilities grew a remarkable 65% from
$674 billion to $1.1 trillion-with $824 billion insured by the FSLIC. However,
the Bank Board did not consider rapid growth a 'problem' until 1985. In an
attempt to reduce FSLIC's risk exposure to losses caused by the failure of rapid
growth thrifts with poorly collateralized loan portfolios, the Bank Board
adopted regulations linking net worth requirements to growth rates and re-
quired thrifts to obtain supervisory approval before directly investing more than
10 percent of their assets in potentially high-risk ventures .... In 1985 the
House Banking Committee approved legislation to curtail thrift direct invest-
ment powers, but the legislation never reached the House Floor.
House Report, supra note 2, at 299, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
at 95. Computers and advanced technology further enabled brokers to move funds
around the country with enormous speed and ease. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at
74-75.
128. See S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 27-28 (testimony of Rep. Joseph Ken-
nedy, II). Thrifts were previously authorized to invest only five percent of total assets in
brokered deposits. See id. Depositor losses from the failure of Penn Square Bank also
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tributed to the deposit influx. Consequently investors were able to obtain
market-rate returns on deposits that were federally insured.
The desire for brokered deposits precipitated an interest rate competi-
tion among thrifts. 12 9 Higher interest rates increased thrift expenses and
resulted in lower profits.13 0 Because of these higher expenses, brokered
deposits had to be invested quickly 13  and at high rates. As a result,
many thrifts made hasty investments 3 2 that involved unusually high
credit risks. 133 Many institutions doubled and tripled in size as a result
of brokered deposits," 4 thereby increasing their investment activity and
the number of new loans being issued. The industry, however, lacked
experienced thrift management and staff to effectively evaluate this in-
creased activity.13 5
In 1984, the FDIC and FHLBB recognized 1 6 that the influx of
brokered deposits encouraged rapid industry-wide growth and risky in-
encouraged depositors to seek insured investments. See Gramley, Statements to Congress,
70 Fed. Reserve Bull. 291, 292 (1984); Seward & Zaitzeff, supra note 126, at 1713.
129. See Klinkerman, High Rates at Insolvent Texas S&L Irk Competitors, Am.
Banker, Oct. 28, 1988, at 10-11; Goodman, Great Places to Put Your Rainy Day Cash,
Money, Mar. 1986, at 113; cf Hayes, supra note 118, at D1, col. 3 (Columbia Savings and
Loan nearly quintupled in size in two years because it paid top dollar to attract funds).
130. See M. Stich, supra note 1, at 30; Klinkerman, supra note 129, at 11. Because of
intense competition for brokered deposits, one commentator estimates that Texas thrifts
paid between 34 and 87 basis points more in interest than the rest of the nation, costing
thrifts nearly $800 million in added interest expense. See Klinkerman, supra note 129, at
11. Shortly before its closure, one Maryland thrift offered a certificate of deposit ("CD")
paying 11.5% interest while New York thrifts were offering a comparable CD paying
only 8.79%. See Krefetz, supra note 15, at 29.
131. See FDIC and FHLBB Final Rule on Brokered Deposits, supra note 127, at 6-7.
132. See id.
133. See Gramley, supra note 128, at 293.
134. See supra note 127.
135. See S & L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 13 (statement of Donald Regan, for-
mer Secretary of the Treasury). Thrift regulators found inadequate credit analysis and
poor loan documentation at 92% of failed thrifts. See House Report, supra note 2, at
300, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 96. Although federal regula-
tions mandated that loans secured by real estate be appraised, 88% of failed thrifts did
not comply; those that did comply often produced insufficient or inaccurate documents.
See id.
136. Indeed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the FHLBB
found
significant correlation between associations which use brokered deposits and
those which have supervisory problems. In 1982 and 1983, more than half of
the insured institutions that were closed by the FSLIC had brokered funds in
excess of one-third of their deposits. Almost half of the institutions with a net
worth below acceptable levels had brokered deposits in excess of 20 percent of
their total deposits.
FDIC and FHLBB Final Rule on Brokered Deposits, supra note 127, at 6. This high
correlation between brokered deposits and thrift failures existed because brokered depos-
its were one of the few sources of funds that troubled institutions were able to attract. See
Gramley, supra note 128, at 293. One commentator argues that "rapid growth... often
funded by brokered deposits" was a key ingredient in most thrift failures since 1982. See
N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 117; cf A. Gart, supra note 35, at 7 (aggressive practices
related to bidding for funds caused an increased risk of thrift failure).
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vestment strategies.1 37  Both agencies thus issued regulations that re-
stricted federal deposit insurance to $100,000 per brokerage firm.' 38
Those regulations were struck down, however, in FAIC Securities, Inc. v.
United States, 139 where the court held that the FDIC and FHLBB lacked
the statutory authority to impose such restrictions. Although the FDIC,
FHLBB'" and Federal Reserve14 looked to Congress for legislation re-
stricting brokered deposits, their pleas went unanswered.
3. Entry of the Thrift Entrepreneurs
After the state and federal liberalization of thrift investment powers,
entrepreneurs were increasingly attracted to thrifts as investments. 42
Such attraction resulted from reduced capital requirements, the availabil-
ity of deposit insurance 143 and the ability to invest in broad classes of
assets. Many of the thrifts that experienced rapid growth between 1983
and 1985 were managed by "speculating neophytes" who tended to in-
vest in non-traditional assets.1"
Some investors viewed thrift ownership as an opportunity to engage in
self-dealing and fraud at taxpayer expense.145 Some commentators have
argued that fraud played a significant role in the thrift debacle, 146 while
others have maintained that fraud was a mere symptom and not a cause
of the overall crisis.147
137. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 118; Isaac, supra note 22, at 5. The Federal
Reserve also supported restrictions on brokered deposits in the form of a "cap" or limit
on the total amount of brokered deposits an institution may maintain. See Gramley,
supra note 128, at 293-94.
138. See Gramley, supra note 128, at 293.
139. See 595 F. Supp. 73, aff'd, 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
140. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 118; Isaac, supra note 22, at 5.
141. See Gramley, supra note 128, at 291.
142. See F. Balderston, supra note 23, at 128. Entrepreneurs entered the industry by
either acquiring existing thrifts or chartering new ones. See id. at 127-28; Long, Schilling
& Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 406.
143. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 69; N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 75; Inside
Job, supra note 2, at 317.
144. See White II, supra note 9, at 12-13.
145. See Rosenbaum, A Financial Disaster with Many Culprits, N.Y. Times, June 6,
1990, at D4, col. 2.
146. Fraud's role in the thrift crisis has been examined quite thoroughly. See, e.g.,
Bank and Thrift Fraud: Hearing before the Senate Banking Committee, Aug. 2, 1990, at
9 [hereinafter Fraud Hearing] (statement of William Seidman, chairman, FDIC)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file); Panel Meeting, supra note 58, at 9 (testimony of
Sen. Donald Riegle, Chairman, Senate Banking Committee); J. Adams, The Big Fix
(1990); R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 69, 86 n.2; G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi, supra
note 82, at 52; Inside Job, supra note 2; Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 406,
410; Chernow, The Menace of the Small Bank, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1990, at A14, Col. 5;
Rosenbaum, supra note 145, at D4, col. 1.
147. See Fraud Hearing, supra note 146, at 5 (statement of Sen. Kerry); Scott, supra




4. Deregulation and Decreased Supervision
A relaxation of regulatory scrutiny facilitated questionable manage-
ment practices. 48 Throughout the early 1980s, White House policy di-
minished the number and responsibilities of thrift examiners.'49
Troubled and insolvent institutions were therefore often overlooked and
not examined on a timely basis.150
The lack of sufficient supervision was exacerbated by a lack of a
trained and experienced examiner force."' Bank examiners that were
trained to analyze long-term mortgage portfolios suddenly found them-
selves scrutinizing complex business transactions such as land swaps, tax
shelters and stock mergers.1 2 Additionally examiners were under-
paid,153 under-trained and over-worked. 15
Commentators have argued that the federal government should have
supervised both state-chartered and federally-chartered thrifts more
closely155 because the federal government was the insurer of thrift activi-
ties. 56 Others have reasoned, however, that state regulators'5" should
have borne the burden of monitoring state-chartered thrifts more closely
in light of increased investment powers granted by state legislatures. 5 8
148. See House Report, supra note 2, at 301, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 97 ("[t]he lack of adequate supervision and examination of thrifts was
one of the primary causes of the thrift crisis").
149. See Bartlett, A Stronger Savings Regulator, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1989, at D7, col.
1. Such cuts were exacerbated by infrequent thrift examinations. See Forum, supra note
58, at 2 (statement of Sen. William Proxmire).
150. Cf. White H, supra note 9, at 12 (due to a decrease in examiner force throughout
the early eighties, "the number of examinations relative to the size of the industry...
fell").
151. See Stich, supra note 1, at 120.
There [was] also a limited staff available to deal with the unprecedented number
of troubled institutions. In 1980 there were 34 FSLIC employees to handle 297
troubled institutions. By 1985, the FSLIC staff had grown to 159 (over half of
whom had only two years of experience), but the number of troubled institu-
tions had risen to 655. Over the same period, the number of field examiners
declined. In 1980 there were 700 examiners to handle 297 troubled institutions.
By 1985, the number of examiners had decreased to 679, while the number of
troubled institutions had increased to 791. Thus, even if the FSLIC's reserves
had been adequate, the limited number of personnel and their relative inexperi-
ence would have made it difficult to address the growing problem of insolvent
institutions in a timely manner.
Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 53.
152. See S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 58 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
153. See M. Stich, supra note 1, at 120.
154. See Inside Job, supra note 2, at 14; Bartlett, supra note 149, at D7, col. 1. Such
conditions were reflected in the field examiner turnover rate, which increased 60% from
1981 to 1984, to over 16% per year. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 67.
155. See S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 8 (statement of Rep. Neal); Panel Meet-
ing, supra note 58, at 8 (testimony of Sen. Donald Riegle, Chairman, Senate Banking
Committee).
156. See Scott, supra note 7, at 1883; White II, supra note 9, at 6.
157. State thrifts "are chartered under state statutes and are supervised and examined
by agencies of the state government." A. Carron, supra note 15, at 2.
158. See Forum, supra note 58, at 8 (statement of Rep. John Lafalce).
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Either way, more stringent regulatory supervision was urgently needed
throughout the 1980s.119
D. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
In a further attempt to revamp the thrift industry, Congress enacted
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 ("CEBA").' 6 CEBA's
purpose was to "ensure that savings associations fulfill their mission of
providing affordable home financing."'' CEBA, among other things,
"formalized and tightened" the qualified thrift lender test ("QTL" Test)
established in 1982 by Garn-St Germain. 162
CEBA's QTL Test required thrifts to maintain at least sixty percent of
their tangible assets in "qualified-thrift investments" in three out of four
quarters for two out of three years.1 63 Thrifts that failed to meet these
levels were eligible to receive Federal Home Loan Bank advances only in
proportion to their qualified thrift investment percentage.164 Addition-
ally, once a thrift failed the QTL Test, it was denied QTL status for a
five-year period. 165
Although Congress intended CEBA's QTL Test to force thrifts to in-
crease home mortgage lending, Congress was dissatisfied with the re-
sult, 6 6 as evidenced by Congress' amendment of the QTL Test two years
later in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act ("FIRREA"). 67 Prior to the FIRREA amendments, assets quali-
fied as qualified thrift investments even if they were "only tangentially
associated with residential real estate and housing," such as deposits held
159. This was especially true because the vast majority of thrifts (83% from 1980 to
1981) were mutual in nature and therefore owned by depositors, not equity stockholders.
See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 2. There was a greater need for monitoring because there
were no stockholders to ensure that the organizations were being run efficiently and not
fraudulently. See Benston, supra note 16, at 14; cf. Sussman, supra note 51, at 30 (stock-
holders have the greatest interest in the financial decisions of an institution and thus
"exert influence over decisions of management").
160. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
161. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1065 (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1987)).
162. Rehm, Bill Would Force Thrifts to Focus on Home Loans or Lose Charters, Am,
Banker, March 23, 1989, at 1.
163. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(o)(1)(B) (1988).
164. See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(e) (1988). For example, a thrift "that had 59% of its tangi-
ble assets invested in qualified thrift investments would only be eligible to receive ad-
vances in amounts equal to 59% of the maximum amount which the association would
have been eligible to receive if it had satisfied the QTL Test." Regulation of Savings
Associations, supra note 6, at 1072.
165. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (n)(2) (1988).
166. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1066.
167. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 303(b), 103 Stat. 183, 350 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a). For a complete discussion of the FIRREA amendments to the QTL Test, see
Note, Playing With FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory Overview of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, in Annual Survey of Finan-
cial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Ford-
ham L. Rev. S323, S328-30 (1991).
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by other thrifts and notes and obligations issued by the FSLIC. 6 Fur-
thermore, CEBA only required thrifts to comply quarterly with the QTL
Test, rather than on a constant basis. 16 9
Some commentators have argued that the sixty percent qualified thrift
investment requirement was insufficient to return thrifts to the home
lending business.17° Others, however, have criticized the QTL Test be-
cause it did not allow thrifts to diversify their assets, but rather forced
them to concentrate their assets in residential mortgage loans that had
already proved troublesome. 7 Still other critics of the QTL Test main-
tain that the test negatively impacted the thrift industry because it made
thrifts less attractive to acquirors and only perpetuated the thrifts finan-
cial difficulties. 172
CONCLUSION
The thrift crisis, the culmination of many forces, could have been
avoided if timely action had been taken. The structure of the industry
was flawed because of its inherent sensitivity to interest-rate risk. Non-
diverse portfolios of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages funded by short-
term obligations proved to be a disastrous combination.
Congress was careless in raising deposit insurance to $100,000 and
granting it to state-chartered thrifts without effectively monitoring their
activities; hence, Congress enabled insured institutions to shift their in-
vestment risks to the taxpayers. Meanwhile, the FHLBB decreased the
level and quality of capital standards, allowing troubled institutions to
increase their total loss exposure by allowing them to lower ownership
equity. Failure to heed calls by the FDIC, FSLIC and the Federal Re-
serve for restrictions on brokered deposits further enabled troubled insti-
tutions to expand.
FIRREA was enacted to bring about vast structural change and was
designed to improve and protect the thrift industry's viability in the fu-
ture. Only time will tell, however, if the debacle of the 1980s can be
overcome.
Robert J. Laughlin
168. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1066-67.
169. See id. at 1068.
170. See Rehm, Bill Would Force Thrifts to Focus on Home Loans or Lose Charters,
Am. Banker, Mar. 23, 1989, at 1.
171. See, eg., Beyond the Beltway, ABA Banking J., at 44 (Mar. 1990) (arguing that
the QTL Test was flawed because it required thrifts to invest too heavily in residential
mortgages).
172. See, e.g., Washington Briefs, ABA Banking J., at 8 (May 1990) (QTL Test "makes
thrifts less attractive to acquire and perpetuates their financial difficulties).
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